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Abstract
Margin trading in which investors purchase shares with money borrowed from bro-
kers is blamed to be a major cause of the 2015 Chinese stock market crash. We
propose a cascading failure model and examine how an increase in margin trad-
ing increases share price vulnerability. The model is based on a bipartite graph of
investors and shares that includes four margin trading factors, (i) initial margin
k, (ii) minimum maintenance r, (iii) volatility v, and (iv) diversity s. We use our
model to simulate margin trading and observe how the share prices are affected by
these four factors. The experimental results indicate that a stock market can be
either vulnerable or stable. A stock market is vulnerable when an external shock
can cause a cascading failure of its share prices. It is stable when its share prices are
resilient to external shocks. Furthermore, we investigate how the cascading failure
of share price is affected by these four factors, and find that by increasing v and r
or decreasing k we increase the probability that the stock market will experience
a phase transition from stable to vulnerable. It is also found that increasing s de-
creases resilience and increases systematic risk. These findings could be useful to
regulators supervising margin trading activities.
Key words: Margin Trading, Cascading failure, Stock market crash, Phase
transition, Bipartite graph
Preprint submitted to Physica A 23 April 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
07
35
2v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  2
 A
pr
 20
18
1 Introduction
During the 2014–2015 period the Chinese stock market experienced ex-
treme volatility and ruinous boom-bust behaviour. The important Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SSE) Composite Index rose approximately 33% in one month
and then fell 29% in seven trading days. Fig. 1(a) shows that the extreme bull
market began in July 2014, that the SSE index reached a seven-year high on
12 June 2015, but that within a short period of a few weeks the same index
dropped sharply in what came to be known as the mid-2015 Chinese stock
market crash.
It is speculated that this erratic Chinese market behaviour was caused in
part by a huge increase in margin trading [1]. Generally speaking, margin trad-
ing uses financial leverage. When investors feel bullish toward an investment
opportunity they borrow capital from brokers or other resources, e.g., shadow
banks, to purchase shares. To minimize losses, brokers require investors to
pay a portion of the share price as a margin and to use the purchased shares
as collateral for the loan. There is also a requirement that there be a mini-
mum maintenance margin, above which the total amount of equity must be
maintained in the margin account [2].
Margin trading is high risk and can yield huge profits or total losses. Because
China’s securities market was immature and approximately 90% of its traders
were retail investors, margin finance and short-selling services were not made
available prior to 2010 [3,4]. In that year the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) conducted a pilot project and allowed shares of a few
dozen companies to be bought on margin or sold short. In September 2014,
the approved list of stocks was expanded to include more than 900 companies.
Fig. 1(b) shows that margin trading rapidly increased and nearly doubled in
the four months from September to December 2014. A huge amount of credit
was injected into the securities market and the SSE Composite Index rapidly
increased. Fig. 1 shows that the time series of the SSE Composite Index and
of margin loans were strongly correlated and fluctuated following the same
trends. During this bull market period, share prices and margin financing
activities promoted each other, and a huge market bubble was created.
Margin financing is a high-risk double-edged sword. Although some pro-
pose that stock price behaviour indicates [5,6,7] that margin eligibility can
raise liquidity [8] and stabilize the market [9], others argue that margin trading
produces excess volatility and destabilizes the market [10,11]. We conjecture
that margin trading activities are a strong factor in the drop in stock prices
during a crash and can accelerate the decline. Fig. 1 shows that immediately
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Fig. 1. (Color Online)(a) SSE Composite Index and (b) margin balance changed
with time from the beginning of 2014 to the end of 2016.
following the sharp drop in share prices, margin lending also dropped sharply,
which in turn accelerated the devaluation of the market index. This behaviour
was described previously [12,13], but the obtained results were based on ob-
servations and regression results and did not explain the mechanism driving
the behaviour.
Here we propose a cascading failure model [14,15,16,17,18] to identify the
mechanism that allows margin trading to amplify the vulnerability of share
price and that caused the 2015 Chinese stock market crash. The basic idea
is that margin-covering resulting from the minimum maintenance margin re-
quirement rapidly decreases share price, which further triggers more margin-
covering and results in a cascading failure of share prices.
2 Model
A bipartite graph is used to show the cascading failure model of margin
trading [19,20,21]. Nodes are divided into two non-overlapping sets of N =
20000 margin investors and M = 1000 shares. We abstract the margin trading
market on this bipartite graph and simplify the model by assigning M shares
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the same market capitalization and price impact factor. Each investor initially
purchase s shares on margin, with one unit of trading volume, namely, each
node from the investors set is linked with s nodes from the shares set. Here
s is a constant and si = s, (i = 1, 2, ..., N) for investor i. Thus the property
in each margin account is the total value of s shares, and all the purchased
shares serve as collateral for the loan.
Suppose the initial margin or the leverage ratio is k ∈ [0, 1), i.e., the deposit
of the investor is a k fraction of the whole property in the margin account,
or the investor borrows 1 − k of the value of all purchased shares. In the
stock market, share prices constantly fluctuate. During a bull market, investing
on margin is a leverage technique that can boost profits. When the market
suddenly drops, those investing on margin may find their margin account
equity insufficient to cover their restriction of maintenance fee. If the equity
in the margin account falls below a certain level, the investor must deposit
more cash to the account to cover the difference. This is referred to as a margin
call. If the investor does not add money quickly enough, the broker can sell the
securities without notice and liquidate the account to cover the loan. We here
denote r the minimum maintenance margin. If the ratio between the market
value of the collateral and the margin loan is less than r, the broker can issue
a margin call.
Initially, the prices of all shares are randomly assigned from a log-normal
distribution, and the mean value of the prices is in the same magnitude of the
SSE Composite Index. We designate the market index p to be the mean value
of share prices, pi,t the price of share i, and pt = Σ
i=M
i=1 pi,t the market index
at time step t. Although actual indices, e.g., the SSE Composite Index, are
usually capitalization-weighted, we here measure the market index using the
mean value of the share prices and assume an equal market capitalization for
all companies. At the first time step, negative factors from external circum-
stances cause share prices to drop. The negative factors could be panic selling
in response to bad news, or the prohibition of shadow margin loans enacted
by Chinese regulators on 12 June 2015 that precipitated an increase in margin
covering and reduced market liquidity. In our model we uniformly distribute
the initial price decline di,1 for stock i across a range of [0,
v
100
], where v de-
notes fluctuation volatility. If v = 10, then the price drop is between 0 and
10%. Thus following the initial shock the share price at the first time step is
pi,t=1 = pi,t=0(1− di,1). A number of share prices drop slightly, and a few drop
sharply. The ensuing cascading failure is then evolved as follows:
• In time step t, the maintenance margin ri,t of investor i is
ri,t =
∑
j∈Mi
pj,t∑
j∈Mi
pj,0(1− k) (1)
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whereMi is the set of shares held by investor i. The numerator of the right-
hand term is the property of each margin account, and the denominator
is the margin loan. According to the minimum maintenance margin rule,
when ri,t < r, the broker liquidates the account and sells all the s shares
belonging to Mi to pay off the margin loan.
• We then obtain the number of selling orders for each company, denoted
nselli,t , (i = 1, 2, ...,M). The current market price pi,t is then calculated to be
pi,t = pi,t−1 − ηinselli,t (2)
Here ηi is the price impact factor that measures the price decline under one
unit of selling order. We set ηi = η = 5, which means the prices of all shares
are equally impacted and decline five units under one unit of selling order.
The margin covering thus increases the number of selling orders, and the
growth of selling orders further depresses the share price, which in turn triggers
the margin call to other margin accounts. This cascading failure continues until
the price no longer cascades, i.e., until the range of price drop converges to a
infinitesimal quantity. Here τ is the total number of cascading time steps. If
margin covering does not cause cascading failure, τ = 1. Otherwise, τ > 1.
3 Results and Discussion
The dynamic process is determined by Eqs. (1) and (2) and the minimum
maintenance margin rule. We analyse this by applying the mean-field method
and approximating the cascading process. Roughly speaking, a margin investor
must liquidate their position and cover their margin when
p0(1− d)
p0(1− k)
=
1− d
1− k < r (3)
Here d is the averaged range of share price decline at the initial shock, and p0
is the average share price at the initial time. Thus margin covering is affected
by minimum maintenance guarantee r, initial margin k, and d. According to
Eq. (3), the growth of d and r or the reduction of k will cause a margin call
to be issued and make the system more vulnerable to cascading failure. On
the other hand d is related to v. Thus in our simulation r, k, and v all affect
cascading failure.
Fig. 2 plots the cascading failure process and shows that the average price
of all shares (the market index) evolves with time. In Fig. 2(a), the value
r = 1.6 is set, and the simulation is carried on for a series of k value, while
in Fig. 2(b), k = 0.5 is set, and cascading processes for different r values are
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Fig. 2. (Color Online) Dynamical process of cascading failure with a variety of (a)k
and (b)r values. Here, market index is the mean value of share prices. After a
number of time steps, the market index reaches a steady state. In (a), r = 1.6, and
the cascading failure evolves differently for different k values, while in (b), various
r values are investigated at k = 0.5. In both plots s = 20, v = 30.
simulated. In both plots v = 30. When k = 0.6 there is no cascading effect
following the initial external shock, but when k decreases to a critical value,
the initial attack will cause the forced selling due to the margin call in some
accounts, thus margin buying activities take places, pulling down the market
index ulteriorly. After a small number of time steps the system converges to
a steady state, all share prices remain approximately constant, and no more
margin accounts are liquidated. This is the classic cascading failure process.
The market index in the steady state is p∞ and the number of active
margin investors in the steady state N∞. Fig. 2(a) shows that when k < 0.6
there is cascading failure. This indicates that the stock market experiences
a phase transition from a stable state to a vulnerable state that is fragile
to external shocks. Note that the minimum market index value p∞ seldom
changes when k = 0.4 ∼ 0.5 because in the steady state all margin accounts
have been liquidated and margin covering reaches its maximum (see Fig. 3).
When the p∞ value is unchanging, the market index drops more rapidly
when k is smaller and more slowly when k is large, slowing the cascading
failure process and allowing market regulators more time to respond. Similar
behaviour for various r are also presented in Fig. 2(b).We then plot the total
cascading time τ as a function of k and r, respectively, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4(a) shows that when k is large there is no margin covering following an
initial shock. Thus τ = 1. This value of τ rapidly increases as k decreases
and reaches its maximum where the value of k becomes kc. When k < kc the
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Fig. 3. (Color Online) Number of margin investors evolves in process of cascading
failure with a variety of (a)k values when r = 1.6 and (b)r values when k = 0.5.
Other parameters are set as s = 20, and v = 30.
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Fig. 4. (Color Online) Total cascading time τ as a function of (a)k values when
r = 1.6, and (b)r values when k = 0.5 , respectively. From the curve the
threshold values of the phase transition kc and rc can be recognized from the peaks.
The results are obtained by averaging over 20 simulation times. In both
plots s = 20 and v = 30.
market damage is severe and after two time steps it reaches its minimum p∞.
Thus kc is the critical point of the phase transition. The dynamical process of
the cascading failure at kc is presented in Fig. 5, and a long plateau stage is
displayed, which is characterized by a random branching process.
Hence there are two attractors in the dynamic process of a bipartite stock
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Fig. 5. (Color Online) The dynamic process of cascading failure at threshold of phase
transition (i.e., r = 1.6,k = 0.509), in which a long-plateau regime is observed. Other
parameters are set as s = 20, and v = 30.
market: the stable and vulnerable states. Fig. 6 plots a two-dimensional phase
diagram to verify this. The colorbar displays different p∞ values, and the phase
diagram shows them as a function of both r and k, each of which is averaged
over 20 simulation times. In all three subplots with various s values, the two
market states are shown. The left region (dark color) is in the vulnerable state
and is more susceptible to cascading failure under an external shock. The right
region (light color) is in the stable state. We denote the critical values of r
and k to be rc and kc, respectively, at which point the system changes from
a stable state to a vulnerable state, and these values are associated with each
other. Fig. 6 shows that as k increases rc also increases, and vice versa. When
k is sufficiently large there is no phase transition, and when it is small
a cascading process occurs irrespective of the r value. The results are accord
with Eq. (1).
In modern portfolio theory, diversification is considered the optimal invest-
ment strategy for lowering risk, but investor diversification may also increases
systematic risk due to the interconnectness [22,23,24,25,26,27]. In the above
simulations, s = 20. Here, in Fig. 6, for different s the phase configuration
remains the same, which means s has little influence on rc and kc values. On
the other hand, the average loss is greater when s is large because the p∞
value in the vulnerable state is much lower when s is large. The reason is if
more shares are purchased on margin by each investor, the initial shock of a
proportion of share prices can give rise to the contagion of more other stocks.
To examine the impact of diversification, we calculate p∞ using different
s values (see Fig. 7). The market bench-march index in the steady state de-
creases monotonically with s, which indicates that diversification can lower
the robustness and resilience of the securities system and result in higher sys-
tematic risk.
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Fig. 6. (Color Online) Phase diagram of the market index as a function of main-
tenance guarantee r and initial margin k. The color represents averaged price of the
stock market, analogous to market index. v = 30 for all plots.
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Fig. 7. (Color Online) p∞ in the steady state vs diversification parameter s, other
parameters are set k = 0.4,r = 1.7,v = 30. The results are obtained by aver-
aging over 20 simulation times.
In recent years, the Chinese stock market has been highly volatile because
of the high proportion of active retail investors [28,29,30,31,32]. From Eq. (1)
we see that high volatility can amplify instability and give rise to cascading
failure. Fig. 8 plots the phase diagram as a function of r and v to examine
how volatility influence rc. Note that when s = 2 there is no cascading failure
in Fig. 8(a). This is because risk contagion is weakened when s is small, hence
at some k value there is no further price decline after the initial shock, but
rc decreases when the volatility is high [see Figs. 8(b) and 8(c)] and a failure
cascade can cause systemic failure even when the minimum maintenance r is
low. Similar results are found in the r− v phase diagram, and these are useful
in shaping regulatory policy in China. To stabilize the securities market, the
stock exchanges have imposed a daily price change limit of 10% on the trading
of shares of listed companies. The influence of this price limitation remains
unclear and is a topic of wide discussion [33]. Here we proposed that this
price limitation can slow margin covering and is thus useful in stabilizing the
market.
According to the margin trading rules set by the SSE, when a stock is
bought on a margin with a proportion that is larger than 25% of its outstand-
ing share capital, the securities exchange must stop the margin financing of
this stock. This rule assumes that a share has a higher risk when the ratio of
margin buying is high. To confirm this, Fig. 9(b) averages the price drop of
stocks with the same margin times in order to link the price drop range
with the margin times. The scatter plot takes the form of a butterfly, and
the results are valid for numerous r and k values. Although the price drop
changes very little in the middle range of margin times, the results fluctuate
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Fig. 8. (Color Online) Phase diagram of maintenance guarantee r and volatility v.
The color represents averaged price of the stock market, analogous to market index.
k = 0.5for all plots, and the results are obtained by averaging over 20
simulation times.
up and down wildly for stocks with small or large margin times. This can be
explained from the distribution of the margin times shown in Fig.
9(a), in which stocks with small or large margin times are few in
number, and this affects the accuracy of the results.
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Fig. 9. (Color Online) The relationship between price decline and margin times. In
this figure k = 0.5, r = 1.8, s = 20, and v = 50, but the results are valid for different
values.
4 Conclusion
We have examined how margin trading affected the mid-2015 stock Chinese
market crash. We use a cascading failure model—a bipartite graph of margin
investors and a set of shares—that demonstrates how margin trading amplifies
the systematic risk. After the initial external shock to the share price, the
minimum maintenance margin required by brokers triggers a cascading margin
that depresses the share price. This broker-induced cascading failure process
can be rapid and can cause a systemic market crash.
To determine the factors influencing the cascading process, several parame-
ters are investigated, including the initial margin k, the minimum maintenance
r, the volatility v, and the diversity s. We find two market states, stable and
vulnerable. In the stable state, an initial price decline affects the market but
does not produce cascading failure, and the resilient system slowly recovers. In
the vulnerable state, an initial price decline produces cascading failure. Both
analytical and simulation results indicate that raising v and r or dropping k
increases the probability that the state of the system will undergo a phase
transition from stable to vulnerable. We also find that diversity, although a
preferred investment strategy, can amplify systematic risk because higher s
values increase stock market vulnerability.
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